Macro Cultural Psychology

Carl Ratner

www.sonic.net/~cr2

Introduction

Macro cultural psychology is a recent addition to the field of cultural psychology. It has been developed by Carl Ratner (2012a-d; Ratner, & El-Badwi, 2011) from the work of Vygotsky and Bronfenbrenner. The motive for developing it is to develop a general theory of psychology that is both scientific and politically useful for solving the social crises that threaten us. Macro cultural psychology is a psychological theory, a cultural theory, and a political theory (Ratner's other chapters in this Encyclopedia explain the political aspects of macro cultural psychology).

Definition

Macro cultural psychology articulates a concrete theory of culture that rests upon macro cultural factors such as social institutions, cultural artifacts, and concepts. These factors are organized in a coherent, interdependent system that is governed by political interests and struggles. Macro cultural psychology explains how macro cultural factors are the primary origins (basis,), characteristics, operating mechanisms, and the function of psychological phenomena. Macro cultural factors are the primary explanatory constructs, descriptors, and predictors of psychology. They are not external influences on psychology; they are its internal constituents. They dominate all other influences on, and constituents of, psychology..

Macro cultural factors are the most important formative influences on psychology and have the most direct and quick influence on psychology. Changes in social policy and social conditions produce rapid, substantive, widespread psychological

changes. No other factor, whether personal or biological, has this combination of effects.

Suicide exemplifies this point. " the suicide rate between 2008 and 2010 increased four times faster than it did in the eight years before the recession. The rate had been increasing by an average of 0.12 deaths per 100,000 people from 1999 through 2007. In 2008, the rate began increasing by an average of 0.51 deaths per 100,000 people a year. Without the increase in the rate, the total deaths from suicide each year in the United States would have been lower by about 1,500... Every rise of 1 percent in unemployment was accompanied by an increase in the suicide rate of roughly 1 percent" (New York Times, Nov. 5, p. A15). The domestic economic recession has caused more deaths (3,000 from 2008-2010 and thousands more since then) than foreign terrorist attacks have caused. The economic crisis produced a greater spike in suicides than any personal or biological factor could. (Even physical disease is influenced more by environmental factors than by internal physiological or personal factors. The risk of heart attack increases monotonically with unemployment. The risk is 22% for individuals who have lost one job, and 63% for individuals who have lost 4 or more jobs. Overall, unemployed individuals are 35%

more likely to suffer heart attacks than employed individuals. No genetic or physiological factor affects the rate of heart attack as much as unemployment does.)

Education and educational psychology exemplify the power of macro cultural factors on psychology. Darling-Hammond (2012) explains that programs such as the war on poverty and the Great Society dramatically reduced poverty, increased employment, rebuilt depressed communities, invested in preschool and K-12 education in poor areas, desegregated schools, funded financial aid for college, and invested in teacher training programs that ended teacher shortages.

These efforts led to large improvements in achievement and attainment from the 60s through the 80s. The black-white reading gap shrank by two-thirds for 17 year-olds, black high school and college graduation rates more than doubled, and in 1975, rates of college attendance among whites, blacks, and Latinos reached parity for the first and only time, before or since.

Almost all these programs were ended or reduced in the 80s, under Reagan's neoliberal revolution and Clinton's continuation of it.

The educational gains of the war on poverty and Great Society were similarly reversed.

Baltodano, (2012) describes this process in detail. She documents the concerted political movement that has been spearheaded from the 1970s onward, by major America corporations to transform every level of education into an institution that cultivates a subjectivity which accepts and promotes corporate needs for occupational precariousness, part-time employment, low wages and benefits, more competition, more administrative control over activity, less individual autonomy, curtailed political critique and freedom (see Ratner, 20113, 2012c; see Ratner's chapter this volume on Capitalism).

University restructuring began in, 1978 when the US Business-Higher Education Forum was established to create partnership between corporations and universities to support science, math, and technology. However, it soon became clear later that the intention of this group was to align higher education institutions to the goals of neoliberalism. Since its inception the Forum was, interested in influencing policy formation

and creating ideological hegemony, aligning higher education with the business and corporate sector. Similar interest groups proliferated later, including a Canadian version, the Canadian Corporate-Higher Education Forum, launched in 1983, and the Business Roundtable consisting of the top 300 CEOs in the U.S., which focused on education from 1989 on.

The increasing presence of corporate executives in boards of regents and boards of trustees of universities aims to influence the direction of their academic and non-academic work to support the expansion of globalization.

The Business Roundtable, was responsible for organizing a powerful group of billionaires, philanthropists, and foundations with the purpose of implementing neoliberal reforms in public education. Part of this original group were the Annenberg Center, the Broad Foundation [from Los Angeles real estate magnate Eli Broad], Education Trust, Harvard Graduate School,

and the editorial boards of major newspapers.

Later on, other powerful players joined this effort, among them: the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Walton Family Foundation, the Dell Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, the Packard Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and the Fisher Fund.

Teach for America, has coalesced with neoliberalism to dismiss the notion that teachers need formal teacher education. TFA's major donors are the: Broad Foundation, the Dell Fundation, the Fisher Fund, and the federal government via AmeriCorps and the US Department of Education. In 2008, Wachovia and Goldman Sachs donated more than $1 million at the national level. In addition the Walton Family Foundation, contributed $9million to TFA, which is the single largest contribution to the organization. In 2008, TFA spent more than $500,000 lobbying state and federal legislatures to pass legislation to approve alternative teacher certification and other pro-business educational

initiatives.

Managerialism has taken over the administration of universities and particularly schools of education. The corporate practices of performance-based assessments, recruiting, marketing, bottom lines, business reports, standardization, work norms, and tuition-based revenues have gradually penetrated the daily life of these academic institutions. Academic capitalism has entered American universities and it is redefining the academic premises upon which the entire higher education system was instituted. (Baltodano, 2012, pp. 495-497, 501; Ratner, 2012c, 2013).

Boltadano's thorough description of this central macro factor highlights its political-economic basis and thrust. Education is not an abstract, universal cultural factor. Nor is it apprehended through general constructs such as formal and informal (i.e., apprenticeship) education. The political economic character of education imbues educational pedagogy and educational psychology with capitalist features, as Baltadano explains (see Kahn, 2010).

Fundamentalist religion is another macro cultural factor that organizes behavior and psychology. "After controlling for class and family background, evidence that a conservative religious upbringing impacts market attainment suggests that conservative religion plays an autonomous role in maintaining gender inequality. If so, the increasing membership in conservative religions may help explain the persistent gender wage gap in earnings despite increases in women's skills and labor market experience" (Glass & Jacobs, 2005, pp. 556).

Fundamentalism is systematic in achieving this gendered economic outcome. It does so through a set of interrelated social requirements:

Empirical evidence has shown diminished educational attainment among women from conservative denominations. Such denominations also encourage earlier marriage and family formation (in part by emphasizing abstinence before marriage), which can lead to higher than average fertility, particularly given religious proscriptions against abortion and certain forms of birth control. These early family investments make labor force

participation less attractive, particularly when combined with beliefs that women should shoulder the major responsibility for family caregiving rather than income generation. Early family formation then lowers subsequent earnings after market entry by prolonging the period in which human capital is depreciating rather than growing and by increasing the domestic labor that mothers typically must perform even after finding employment.

The analyses presented here also tested for positive effects of a conservative religious upbringing on women disadvantaged by lower social class or family disruption. Interactions of conservative religion with family disruption consistently showed no protective function of conservative religion on those from mother-only households on any of the pre-market or market variables studied here. Nor did conservative religious affiliation ameliorate any of the disadvantages of lower class background. As mentioned above, women from households with lower

parental education were singularly disadvantaged by conservative religion in their adult earnings (Glass & Jacobs, pp. 557-558, 574).

Religiosity is influenced by social class: from 1972-1976 29% of upper middle class individuals were non-religious, and this increased to 40% between 2006-2012. In contrast, 38% of working class individuals were secular in the 70s and this increased to 59% between 2006-2010.

Importantly, social class has variable effects in different eras. It did not differentiate among out of wedlock births in 1970, but it did in 2008; it had small affect on secularism in the 1970s (only a 9% difference among classes) but a large affect in 2006-2010 (40% vs. 59%). Similarly, social class only differentiated marriage rates by 10% in 1960, but by 35% (83% vs. 48%) in 2010. The reason for this difference is that governmental social programs for working class people offset the effects of social class in the 60s and 70s. However, the neoliberal revolution that has stretched from Reagan to Obama, eliminated these compensating subsidies and allowed social class to become more unequal and more blatant.

Psychological phenomena are macro cultural factors

The foregoing examples of psychology demonstrate they are formed in macro cultural factors, they have cultural bases and features, they are socially distributed, they are culturally administered, and they are culturally functional. This gives psychological phenomena the form of a macro cultural factor. Martin (2004) explains how gender is a social institution. The same may be said of self-concept, romantic love, sense of time, femininity, masculinity, sexual pleasure, privacy, mental illness, childhood, and aesthetic taste in music/art/literature. All of these are politically inspired and maintained; they are enduring, stable, objective activities; they represent and characterize a society; they are changed through mass, political action that transforms their institutional basis and structure.

A case is point is self-esteem. Cruikshank (1996) utilizes a Foucaultian standpoint to explain how self-esteem is a culturally-induced and culturally-functional form of self-governance. "There is nothing personal about self-esteem" (ibid., p. 231). "The self-esteem movement was spearheaded by the California Task Force to Promote Self-esteem and

Personal and Social Responsibility in 1983, to deliver a technology of subjectivity that will solve social problems from crime and poverty to gender inequality" (p. 231). "Self-esteem is a practical and productive technology for the production of certain kinds of [culturally necessary] selves..., a specialized knowledge [competency] of how to esteem our selves, to estimate, calculate, measure, evaluate, discipline, and to judge our selves" so as to be socially responsible and socially functional (ibid., p. 233). "Self-esteem is a [culturally provided] technology of citizenship and self-government for evaluating and acting upon ourselves so that the police, the guards, and the doctors do not have to" (p. 234).

Emphasizing that self-esteem is a cultural technology, or cultural template, for producing cultural behavior makes self-esteem a macro cultural factor, like gender, sexuality, emotionality, religion, and entertainment, which also produce cultural behavior – romantic love is a cultural-psychological emotional template for guiding marital behavior; Saudi Islamic gender and sexuality are cultural-psychological templates for guiding obedient behavior; they are macro cultural factors that characterize and regulate society. Self-esteem is formulated at the macro cultural-political level by social leaders as a way of inducing normative cultural behavior. It is promoted through cultural artifacts such as reading material,

entertainment, psychological science, psychotherapy, and judicial standards. "Deficient self-esteem" is a cultural psychological category that is utilized by social authority as justification to intervene in, and punish, a person's behavior, and re-engineer it to make it more socially functional. A psychological phenomenon has the status of a legal phenomenon that warrants social intervention, just as mental illness does. Of course, social engineering of self-esteem is disguised by claiming to help the individual to become self-fulfilled.

Self-esteem has sources in various macro cultural factors. The relative weight of any one factor must be assessed relative to other sources. The kind of self-esteem that was objectified/codified in the Calif. Task Force legislation may have been modified or overridden by the kind that was objectified in other cultural factors such as advertising or entertainment programs. Assessing this is an important methodological task for cultural psychologists. Historical methodology is an important element in accomplishing this task.

Cultural factors (social structure) and psychology are two sides of the same coin

Cultural factors are informed by, and objectify, cultural meanings/subjectivity that their founders constructed (this social construction process includes political struggle with competing interests). Oyserman & Lee (2008, p. 331) state this succinctly: "a particular cultural [factor] is likely to carry with it relevant goals, motives, actions, ways of interpreting information, and processing strategies." Cultural factors also transmit cultural significances and cultural psychology to peoples' subjectivity as they use cultural artifacts in their activity. Cultural factors thus shape subjects' psychology via peoples' activity. Activity draws cultural psychology from cultural artifacts into the subjectivity of cultural participants. Activity does not spontaneously create personal meanings. For instance, architecture embodies social, political, and psychological characteristics that shape identity according to the dominant interests that commission architectural forms.

This dialectical process of objectivation, externalization, internalization, subjectivation, and subjectivity is illustrated in private property. Private property contains the social (legal) right to acquire it, dispose of it, speculate on it, instrumentalize it. Owning property confers these rights on the possessor. Property constitutes one's ability and agency to accomplish the opportunities contained within it. E.g., private property is both the

goal, motive, and means for enriching oneself materially, socially, and psychologically. One cannot achieve these without possessing private property. This is why capitalists have to place people and resources within the private property legal-socioeconomic form in order to make money off them. Water and genes are privately owned, and laborers are wage-earners for private capitalists so that capitalists can make money off them. People cannot make money off others as individuals, apart from the commodity, private property form. "Property relations structure our relationship not only to resources necessary for life, but to life itself and even ourselves." "Privatization [of property] is a disciplinary process that creates new kinds of subjects (both owners and workers) and [objects] commodities" as Marx said (Mansfield, 2007, pp. 394, 398). People must act through social institutions, artifacts, and cultural concepts, and actively strive to structure their behavior/psychology in terms of these "mediational means." Property is the exogram, the external locus of individual wealth and wealth-seeking that becomes individualized in individual consciousnesses as Vygotsky said.

Collective property would afford/demand a different kind of agency that would work for the common good rather than individual enrichment. Collective property would exclude individualistic agency, not by legal

prohibitions and punishments, but by affording no socioeconomic

opportunity for it. There would simply be no way an individual could enrich

herself because she could never own and sell property by herself.

Consequently, she would never develop individualistic psychology/agency.

Individualistic agency is as much a cultural artifact as private property (on

which it depends) is.

Property sets the contours of the kind of intelligence one must

develop to take advantage of its affordances. Far from a general, native

intelligence mastering private property, intelligence must adapt to the

strictures of private property. Different macro cultural factors possessing

different requirements and affordances lead to adopting different forms of

intelligence.

The fact that cultural factors contain and objectify subjectivity, and

subjectivity is organized by cultural factors, dissolves the conceptual

antagonism between social structure and subjectivity/agency. We can

properly speak of social structures such as social class and capital

possessing dynamics, strivings, motives, and interests: "The ruling class

preserves its hegemony by controlling social institutions." "Capital seeks to

augment itself by seeking out speculative financial opportunities." "Capital

is expansionist," "capital is exploitive." Macro cultural factors possess

subjectivity, the subjectivity of their representatives/agents. Social dynamics are undertaken by human individuals who represent the character and requirements of capital and social class in their praxes. Individuals think in terms of their class, what their class needs to preserve itself and advance, what capital needs to preserve itself and advance. Human psychology/subjectivity/agency is cultural; this means that individual expressions actually represent and promulgate common cultural bases and characteristics that are embedded in psychology/subjectivity/agency.

   Structuralism and agency are reciprocal and complementary, not antagonistic. Structures contain subjectivity, and subjectivity contains objective cultural features. This dialectical relationship is generally misunderstood. Social structures and subjectivity are usually misconstrued as antagonistic: Social structures are reified and deprived of subjectivity, and subjectivity is treated as free and personal, deprived of objective cultural features and functions. Reification and subjectivism are erroneous, one-sided concepts that dichotomize culture and psychology. Subjectivism renders cultural factors inert and reified because it ensconces subjectivity in a personal and autonomous mental domain that is neither influenced by nor expressive of nor promulgating cultural factors (structures, systems). Reification similarly excludes subjectivity from cultural factors and consigns

it to an autonomous, asocial, purely subjective realm of subjectivism where it cannot inform cultural factors nor transform them. The twin errors of reification and subjectivism are complementary and foster each other. Cultural psychology/subjectivity/agency refutes reification and subjectivism by integrating subjectivity and structural, cultural factors.

Keywords: Vygotsky, methodology, culture, education, private property, discourse analysis, cross-cultural psychology, activity theory

History

One root of macro cultural psychology is the German human sciences movement of the 18th and 19th centuries. This movement was especially influential in anthropology, as it extended from Herder (1744-1803) to Helmholtz to Malinowski, and Franz Boas and his students Mead and Sapir, and their students. This movement regarded cultures as concrete, coherent, social systems of socially constructed macro factors such as institutions, laws, belief systems, and artifacts.

A major figure in this human sciences movement was Wilhelm Dilthey. He articulated a macro cultural psychological approach in <u>Introduction to the Human Sciences</u> (<u>Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften</u>), 1883, and <u>Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology</u> (1884). These are summarized by Harrington (2000): To understand a psychologically interesting personality such as Martin Luther, for example, meant holistically investigating as much as possible of the unique context of his historical situation and explaining his actions in terms of this context. It meant interpreting Luther's personal development and religious beliefs in the framework of dominant structural changes in the society of his time and milieu. We then reach our explanation of his deeds by testing our psychological precepts against the context of his manifest utterances and becoming acquainted with the language of the period (p. 442).

Especially in his later works (after 1900), Dilthey emphasized the cultural formation of experience. Dilthey applied Verstehen and hermeneutics to comprehending cultural values rather than idiosyncratic meanings embodied in expressions. It would be accurate to describe Dilthey's work on interpretation between 1893 and 1910 as turning from a psychologistic to a cultural hermeneutic.

Simmel's research on interpretation between 1892 and 1918 parallels this same shift. Dilthey argued that Verstehen should recast personal experience in cultural terms, and he even redefined Verstehen as "objective immersion in a cultural tendency." Dilthey's cultural orientation to Verstehen led him to criticize Husserl's transcendental philosophy which neglected cultural themes (Ratner, 1997, pp.132-133).

The Soviet philosopher Ilyenkov similarly emphasized that "Psychology must necessarily proceed from the fact that between individual consciousness and objective reality there exists the "mediating link" of the historically formed culture, which acts as the prerequisite and condition of individual mental activity. This comprises the economic and legal forms of human relationships, the forms of everyday life and forms of language, and so on" (Ilyenkov, 2012, p. 187).

Ilyenkov explains an important implication of this "materialist" cultural position that incorporates, but is not reducible to, the linguistic turn in philosophy and social science. He quotes Leontyev, "Thus, meaning refracts the world in the consciousness of man. Although language is the bearer of meanings, it is not their demiurge.

Behind linguistic meanings hide socially produced methods (operations) of activity, in the course of which people alter and cognize objective reality. In other words, meanings represent the ideal form of the existence of the objective world, its properties, connections and relations, transformed and folded in the matter of language, which are disclosed in the aggregate of social practice. This is why meanings themselves, that is to say, abstracted from their functions in individual consciousness, are by no means 'mental', as is that socially cognised reality, which lies behind them" (p. 188).

This general emphasis on the historical constitution of psychology needs to be supplemented with a specific cultural theory that identifies the structure and content of cultural factors. This will guide cultural psychologists to apprehend the full character of cultural influences on psychology Such a specific cultural theory was developed by Marx and Engels. They demonstrated that macro culture is an organized social system in which political economy is the most dominant element. This means that cultural psychologists need to apprehend political economic features of cultural factors and psychological factors. Engels explained this in a letter to Borgius, Jan. 25, 1894:

What we understand by the economic conditions, which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society, are the methods by which human beings in a given society produce their means of subsistence and exchange the products among themselves (in so far as division of labour exists)...Under economic conditions are further included the geographical basis on which they operate and those remnants of earlier stages of economic development which have actually been transmitted and have survived – often only through tradition or the force of inertia; also of course the external milieu which surrounds this form of society.

We regard economic conditions as the factor which ultimately determines historical development. But race is itself an economic factor.

Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is not that the economic position is the

cause and alone active, while everything else only has a

passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of

the economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts

itself. The state, for instance, exercises an influence by

tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system.

So it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to

imagine, that the economic position produces an automatic

effect. Men make their history themselves, only in given

surroundings which condition it and on the basis of actual

relations already existing, among which the economic

relations, however much they may be influenced by the

other political and ideological ones, are still ultimately the

decisive ones, forming the red thread which runs through

them and alone leads to understanding (pp. 441-442; see

Delacroix & Nielsen, 2001, Sanderson, et al. 2011, for

illustration).

Macro cultural psychology adopts this as its cultural theory – as

Vygotsky, Luria, and Leontiev did (Ratner, 2012a). This cultural

theory is advantageous because it emphasizes that culture is a

concrete, logical, intelligible, enduring, and also changeable system. Culture can be efficiently changed by changing its core political economy along with the system of related elements. This specific cultural theory is additionally advantageous because it identifies the most important cultural factors that bear on psychology and should be considered in explaining, describing, and predicting psychological phenomena. General theories of culture provide no such guidance.

Marx emphasized that in certain societies, social and psychological phenomena appear to be individual, personal, interpersonal constructions rather than macro cultural phenomena (constructed by people as they form and maintain macro cultural factors). However, this is an illusion. For instance, the self in capitalist countries generally appears to be isolated, independent, self-reliant, self-responsible, and self-expressive. This presentation is distorted because it overlooks the fact that the bourgeois self is culturally formed, and is socially supported by parents, teachers, friends, and others. Marx (1973, p. 156) explained this: "private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the

form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions independent of all."

Practical Relevance

Generally speaking, macro cultural factors lift humans to richer forms of experience and expression than acultural animals can achieve, or that individual humans can achieve on their own

Macro cultural factors provide the stimulation and support for psychological phenomena to be complex, conscious, symbolic, shared, subjective phenomena. Macro cultural factors elevate, enhance, enrich, and civilize the individual far above animal capacities (Ratner & McCarthy, 1990; Senses & Society, 2011, vol. 6, issue 1). Frantz Fanon (2008, p. xv) eloquently said, "Man is what society brings into being." "Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny there is sociogeny." "All of humans' most impressive cognitive achievements -- from complex technologies to linguistic and mathematical symbols to complex social institutions -- are not the products of individuals but rather of groups of individuals cooperating together and creating artifacts and practices that accumulate

improvements (rachet up in complexity) across generations over cultural-historical time" (Callaghan, et al. 2011, p. 1). This is why psychology is culturally variable.

Of course, some macro cultural factors oppress and stifle human competencies. However, even these civilize people in ways that animal interactions and instincts cannot. The most oppressed slave thinks, uses language, sings songs, makes instruments, remembers events, and has social relations in ways that are more advanced than any animal.

Music

In music, the classical sonata form is an enriching macro cultural factor that is a template for composing rich, deep music. It structures the musical ideas that come to the composer. Of course, the great composers were incredibly creative in using the sonata form; not everyone who used that form was equally profound. However, the creativity of the geniuses was structured by that form. The form not only afforded them the tools to create profound music; more so, the sonata form required that they think musically in a structured form that was the germ of their profundity and creativity. In contrast, neither simple tribal dance/music forms nor

contemporary musical forms provide the guidance and impetus for deep music.

Scientific thinking principles, and certain philosophical principles are additional examples of cultural forms that deepen and elevate individual thinking.

Responsibility

Macro cultural psychology introduces a new take on the concept of personal responsibility. Because psychological phenomena depend upon cultural stimulation, socialization, and structuring, the individual is not entirely responsible for his behavior/psychology. He does not invent it, is not completely aware of its origins and characteristics, does not fully control it, and cannot easily alter it.

Galt (2012) debunks the individualistic notion of personal responsibility that is based upon free, rational choice informed by knowledge. He studied the reasons that Costa Rican farmers fail to wear protective gear while working with toxic pesticides. He shows that this self-destructive behavior was not freely chosen by farmers in an act of individual responsibility. The behavior was generated by a complex of cultural factors — informational, political-economic, cultural, individual, and environmental — to which farmers are subject.

These include cultural concepts such as

- beliefs in personal immunity ("I'll never get sick from toxins because I'm too strong or too healthy or too lucky;" "I'm macho")

- fatalism ("whether I get sick or not is luck and doesn't depend upon my actions")

- heroic sacrifice ("I don't wear the gear because I need to work hard, no matter what happens to me").

Additional cultural factors that encourage risky behavior include work pressures to work rapidly. Bulky protective gear prevents achieving maximum productivity.

Improving farmers' use of protective gear requires eradicating these structural, cultural pressures that impede wearing it. Simply providing farmers with knowledge about the risks of not wearing gear, and encouraging them to act rationally and responsibly on this information will fail because the interfering cultural causes are ignored. The possibilities of action – e.g., wearing protective gear – depend upon cultural- political considerations; it is warranted to speak of "the politics of possibilities" as well as " the politics of choice." These politically charged terms correct the depoliticized,

deculturalized notion of personal responsibility and pure knowledge that

supersede all contextual influences.

Traditional Debates

Naturalistic psychology

The prevalent view of psychology is that it is determined primarily by

natural-biological processes and is therefore universal. Macro cultural

psychology maintains that biological processes are certainly involved in

processing psychological phenomena, however they do not determine it, as

genes determine eye color, for example. Biological processes are general

processors of psychological phenomena that are culturally determined. This

is analogous to computer hardware being the necessary processor of the

words someone types, but the hardware does not determine the content of

what is typed. Typing would not occur without the hardware, but typing is

not reducible to or determined by the hardware that processes it.

Jack, et al. (2012, p. 7241) explain how emotions repudiate the

naturalistic view of emotions:

Since Darwin's seminal works, the universality of facial expressions of emotion has remained one of the longest standing debates in the biological and social sciences. Briefly stated, the *universality hypothesis* claims that all humans communicate six basic internal emotional states (happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sad) using the same facial movements by virtue of their biological and evolutionary origins. Here, we refute this assumed universality. Using a unique computer graphics platform that combines generative grammars with visual perception, we accessed the mind's eye of 30 Western and Eastern culture individuals and reconstructed their mental representations of the six basic facial expressions of emotion. Cross-cultural comparisons of the mental representations challenge universality on two separate counts. First, whereas Westerners represent each of the six basic emotions with a distinct set of facial movements common to the group, Easterners do not. Second, Easterners represent emotional intensity with distinctive dynamic eye activity. By refuting the long-standing

universality hypothesis, our data highlight the powerful

influence of culture on shaping basic behaviors once

considered biologically hardwired (see Ratner 2012a,

2013).

Micro cultural psychology

A counter-revolution in cultural psychology has transformed it into

the study of individual subjectivity and activity that uses cultural features

for personal interests. I call this micro cultural psychology (Ratner, 2012a,

chap. 6). In this view, which is advocated by Valsiner and others, culture

has no substance that stimulates, shapes, directs, or socializes

psychological phenomena. On the contrary, individuals freely choose

cultural offerings to use for their own interest, expression, and

development. Culture is "a tool kit" from which people choose which tool

they wish to use to construct their activity. They can freely accept, reject,

or modify any cultural means in pursuit of their own ends. There is no need

for individuals, or social scientists, to consider cultural structure or

dynamics, because none of that matters to the individual who can use

cultural phenomena any way she wishes. Culture is her private playground

in which she skips around freely and imaginatively. Culture is dissolved into individual usages of it; therefore, sociology, political-economy, geography and other disciplines that research <u>culture</u> are irrelevant. History is also irrelevant because it doesn't matter what actually happened in the past, or which historical forces need to be considered. What is important for micro cultural psychologists is how events are interpreted and imagined and utilized by individuals today.

Substantial documentation confirms that micro cultural psychology is scientifically wrong. Political, cultural structures are real, and they are the foundation of psychology, stimulate it, demand it, organize it, support it, and socialize it. Individuals make culture coherent through their similar choices, but only because cultural structures structure individual choices in similar ways.

Far from society and psychology being constructed bottom-up from interpersonal negotiations, all of these are organized in, through, and for macro cultural processes. Callaghan, et al. (2011, p. 15) present one example of interpersonal eye contact: In contrast with American mothers who strive to maintain eye contact with their children, Yucatec Mayan mothers seldom make and maintain eye contact with their infants. A study that compared mother–infant communication (of infants age 12 weeks) in a

Western middle-class culture with that in a more traditional, rural culture in Africa (the Nso), found that the general pattern in the Western, middle class group is one in which mothers position their infants as quasi-equal partners, engaging them in collaborative negotiations and structuring the interactions in a dyadic turn- taking. The focus is on the individual experience and personal preferences of the child. The general pattern in the Nso group is one in which mothers position their infants as novices who need to learn compliance and subordination. The interactions are lopsidedly structured by the mothers. These interpersonal social relations and socialization of psychology clearly reflect, prepare for, and support macro social relations of the respective cultures.

In a different refutation of micro cultural psychology, Hull & Nelson (2000) systematically researched whether the gender wage gap and status gap among lawyers is due to individual choices (to pursue less rigorous education, work at lower-paying government jobs, or spend more time caring for children and performing housework) for which women are individually responsible (see the section on responsibility), or whether it is due to structural factors such as male bias in promotion and retention policies. The data confirm other studies which found that gender inequality in pay and work status result from institutional constraints on post-entry

advancement even when training, type of firm, family obligations, and employment tenure are equal between males and females. Micro level processes such as personal choices and meanings are far less influential determinants of women's success than external constraints they cannot control.

Individuals do not simply use social resources; social institutions determine what resources people have available to use and the choices they have available to use them.

Sexual relations are a good example. The intimate, personal nature of sexual relations is socially organized. A prevalent social form of sexuality among college students is called "hook-up" relations. Their social organization and social character are described in an extensive report entitled, "She Can Play That Game, Too," <u>New York Times</u>, July, 14, 2013, p. ST1.

At 11 on a weeknight earlier this year, her

work finished, a slim, pretty junior at the University

of Pennsylvania did what she often does when she

has a little free time. She texted her regular hookup

— the guy she is sleeping with but not dating. What

was he up to? He texted back: Come over. So she

did. They watched a little TV, had sex and went to sleep. Their relationship, she noted, is not about the meeting of two souls. "We don't really like each other in person, sober," she said, adding that "we literally can't sit down and have coffee."

Ask her why she hasn't had a relationship at Penn, and she won't complain about the death of courtship or men who won't commit. Instead, she'll talk about "cost-benefit" analyses and the "low risk and low investment costs" of hooking up.

"I positioned myself in college in such a way that I can't have a meaningful romantic relationship, because I'm always busy and the people that I am interested in are always busy, too."

Elite universities today are filled with driven young women, many of whom aspire to be doctors, lawyers, politicians, bankers or corporate executives. Keenly attuned to what might give them a competitive edge, especially in a time of unsure

job prospects and a shaky economy, many of them

approach college as a race to acquire credentials:

top grades, leadership positions in student

organizations, sought-after internships. Their time

out of class is filled with club meetings, sports

practice and community-service projects.

These women said they saw building their

résumés, not finding boyfriends (never mind

husbands), as their main job. They envisioned their

20s as a period of unencumbered striving, when

they might work at a bank in Hong Kong one year,

then go to business school, then move to a

corporate job in New York. The idea of lugging a

relationship through all those transitions was hard

for many to imagine.

In this context, some women, seized the

opportunity to have sex without relationships,

preferring "hookup buddies" (regular sexual partners

with little emotional commitment) to boyfriends.

For them, college is an endless series of competitions: to get into student clubs, some of which demand multiple rounds of interviews; to be selected for special research projects and the choicest internships; and, in the end, to land the most elite job offers. "We are very aware of cost-benefit issues and trading up and trading down, so no one wants to be too tied to someone that, you know, may not be the person they want to be with in a couple of months," one girl said.

Instead, she enjoyed casual sex on her terms — often late at night, after a few drinks.

"I definitely wouldn't say I've regretted any of my one-night stands," she said. "I'm a true feminist," she added. "I'm a strong woman. I know what I want."

These interviews reveal how these students' sexual relations were structured by socioeconomic pressures. Students did not draw on culture (as a tool kit) to express their own personal interests. On the contrary, they adjusted their personal interests and sexuality to cultural demands. These include:

- intense competitive pressure to outperform student rivals for limited educational and employment resources

- materialistic success supersedes personal relations

- egoism of capitalist culture where self-interest and self-satisfaction supersedes interpersonal relations

- objectification of people as commodities to be used for the other's personal/egoistic satisfaction/advantage

- humans are a material investment, a cost of production and a depletion of profit, to be minimized through a calculation of cost-benefit analysis: low risk, low investment, large returns

- estrangement of people in an impersonal, individualistic society

- demeaning of sensuality to impulsive sensationalism

- utilizing bourgeois feminism to guide and justify impersonal, egoistic behavior: "I am a true feminist. I know what I want."

Students' sexuality internalizes these social values and practices, and it externalizes them in new forms of subjectivity and personal relations. These render them more amenable to capitalist economic requirements of competition, commodification of people, cost-benefit materialism, and subordinating personal relations to capital.

Students who hook-up utilize capitalist practices as their "mediational means" of engaging with the social world and developing "entrepreneurial selves," as Foucault called it. They use their agency to devise "structured improvisations" in personal relations. These active constructions contribute to their own depersonalization, objectification, commodification, and exploitation.

In addition, each hook-up student extends capitalism into the personal, intimate, sexual lives of their partners. Each woman who opts for a hook-up relation is depersonalizing, commodifying, estranging, and instrumentalizing her partner -- just as much as any capitalist manager does, though in different, more insidious ways.

Each hook-up student is oppressed by capitalist culture, but is also an oppressor of other students; each is oppressed but also oppressive. They are victims who victimize others.

Each contributes to extending capitalism by depersonalizing the personal realm instead of resisting capitalism by developing caring personal relations that could critique capitalist depersonalization. Their agency is capitalist agency that reproduces capitalism; it is not personal, autonomous, emancipatory agency.

It is a mistake to blame hook ups on alcohol (alcohol makes girls lose control) and on sexism (boys take advantage of girls). Many interviewees make sober, willful calculations about their sexuality. They are complicit in oppression; they are oppressors as well as oppressed; victimizers as well as victims. Blaming alcohol and sexism for hook-up sex depoliticizes and deculturizes it. It strips this sexuality of its full cultural and political basis, character, and function.

The work of Foucault and his followers is a powerful critique of micro cultural psychology. For it demonstrates how seemingly personal psychological phenomena are forms of culturally regulated (disciplined) subjectivity. (Foucault's cultural-historical psychological work, and that of Bourdieu's, is not referenced by cultural psychologists.)

Discourse analysis

Micro cultural psychology is particularly active in discourse analysis. It treats discourse as the private playground of the individual, who says anything she wishes, to express her own agency and interests

This subjectivistic, individualistic conception of culture and discourse is challenged by Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Linguistics, in the journal Critical Discourse Studies. CDA and CL do emphasize cultural norms and constraints on speech. They identify cultural themes in individual discourse to demonstrate that people's ideas and words are shaped by cultural structures that matter. Norm Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk, Ruth Wodack are outstanding critical discourse analysts. It is noteworthy that critical discourse analysts are not found in psychology departments. They are in departments of English, rhetoric, and sociology.

Wodak (1995) explains that CL and CDA may be defined as fundamentally interested in analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. Most critical discourse analysts would thus endorse Habermas' claim that "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organised power" (ibid.). In contrast to other paradigms in discourse and text analysis, CL and CDA focus not exclusively on spoken or written texts as objects of inquiry. "A

fully 'critical' account of discourse would require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social-historical subjects create meanings in their interaction with texts" (ibid.) Consequently, three concepts figure indispensably in CDA: the concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology.

In his study of Palestinian and Israeli youth narratives, Hammack found these concepts embedded in the narratives (although he does not refer to CDA): "The structural reality of the state and its economic and political interests infuses the personal narratives of youth precisely by deploying discourses – whether through textbooks, media political speeches, or the particular content of policies themselves – that maintain those interests and reproduce a status quo" and "contribute to the cycle of conflict" (Hammack, 2011, pp. 339, 13). Hammack calls cultural discourses contained in books, speeches, and policies "master narratives," i.e., cultural scripts or templates. He demonstrates that these macro cultural factors are incorporated into personal statements, beliefs, and identities. For instance one Israeli young woman said, "I don't really understand why [the Palestinians] need a country because they have so many." "They need to

stop complaining about the things they don't have" (ibid., pp. 152-153).

Hammack (p. 153-4, 156-157) notes, "Ayelet's view of the Palestinians thus conforms to an extent with the delegitimization of Palestinian identity contained in the master narrative...Ayelet has internalized the power imbalance in identity that Orientalism as an ideology establishes." "What seems initially to be a rejection of the master narrative – a recognition of the Palestinians and a genuine sympathy for their plight, as well as an expressed identification with their experience – gives way to a greater degree of conformity by the narrative's end." "The thematic content of youth narratives reveals key points of convergence with the master narrative. The theme of Jewish persecution and victimization is consistently present." "As youth write these stories of ambivalence, they are participants in the reconstruction of a master narrative of identity...Through the practice of life story construction, young Jewish Israelis appear to reproduce the status quo of the conflict."

This macro cultural organizing of personal experience and narrative contradicts the notion that individuals utilize narratives to construct personal meanings and negotiate/resist culture (a notion that Hammack, pp. 27, 32-33 also espouses). If personal narratives are shaped by the structural reality of the state and its economic and political interests, it

follows that individuals can only change their narratives if there are corresponding macro cultural changes at the political-economic level. Additionally, interpersonal conflicts can only be harmonized through macro cultural changes (see chapter on emancipation, this encyclopedia).

Cross-cultural psychology

Cross-cultural psychologists attempt to study macro cultural factors in relation to psychology. However, their conception of cultural factors is deficient. It construes them as static, given, abstract, quantitative variables. Cross-cultural psychologists hardly study concrete cultural factors as they embody and express a concrete social system. They aver basing their description and explanation of cultural factors on a country's political economy, sociology, geography, or history -- e.g., American neoliberal capitalism, or Chinese socialist-capitalist society that is controlled by a monolithic Communist Party, or contemporary Islamic society. Cross-cultural psychologists never mention political struggle and repression that produces and sustains these factors. Cross-cultural psychologists never compare the concrete, qualitative, educational-psychological effects of American neoliberal education with those of Norweigian public education, or Jihadist, Islamic education. Nor do they compare Chinese communist

collectivism of the 1950s-80s with Israeli kibbutzim collectivism or with Jihadist, Islamic collectivism. The Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology has only mentioned the word capitalism once in its entire history.

Cross-cultural psychologists reduce cultural factors to vague abstractions such as individualism and collectivism, neuroticism, social control, permissiveness, religiosity, and social complexity. These are presented as devoid of origins, dynamics, and politics. Frequently, cross-cultural psychologists ignore even these deficient cultural constructs and simply compare the psychology of Ss from different countries.

Cross-cultural psychologists similarly contort concrete psychological phenomena (such as modern romantic love, modern parental love, modern Korean shame, Mexican depression, the bourgeois self, the modern Islamic self, or Islamic femininity and masculinity) into abstractions such as openness, emotional complexity, self-concern, self-esteem, contextual perception, and social sensitivity (Ratner, 2012c, 2012d; Ratner & Hui, 2003).

For example, Uskul, et al. (2012) tested the hypotheses that Turkish and (Northern) American cultures afford different honor-relevant situations, and different responses to honor-code violations in these situations. Macro cultural psychological research on this topic would identify concrete

cultural situations that were based in social institutions, artifacts, and cultural concepts. For example, we would study honor killings as particular to Islamic honor codes that stipulate girls' pre-marital virginity as a badge/symbol of honor to her family and the entire community. When a girl violates this code, she casts aspersions on her family and the community, all of whom are implicated in her honor because she represents them. The code sanctions violations by encouraging the family or community members to kill the girl. Uskul, et al. did not take this approach in researching honor. Instead, they defined honor-attacking (violating) situations in terms of the banal abstractions "individualism" and "collectivism." From their abstract etic, they found that honor-attacking situations defined by American participants focused more on the individual perpetrator and observer; whereas Turkish people regarded violations of honor as dishonoring extended networks of relatives and the community. The cultural differences in defining and reacting to dishonor boiled down to the number of individuals who were deemed to have been affected by it. In the case of honor killings, Uskul's approach would disregard (and obfuscate) the concrete character of the dishonor (pre-marital sex) and the specific response to it (fury, and killing a daughter), which emanate from a rich, "thick" network (hermeneutic circle) of family structure, community

structure, gender relations, the individual, sexuality, religion, and a mode of producing goods. "Thick" description and explanation would be thinned into insignificance.

The tendency toward abstraction of cultural and psychological factors is exacerbated by positivistic methodology that dominates cross-cultural psychology. (Qualitative methodology is also frequently used to yield abstract stimulus questions and responses – e.g., "I strive to be happy," "I manage my affairs well," "I get along with my family." However, qualitative methodology has more potential to elicit and elucidate concrete issues; Ratner, 2012d.) Positivism construes cultural and psychological factors as variables. A variable, as defined by any introductory textbook, is a phenomenon that is qualitatively invariant and only varies quantitatively. Variables are quantifiable because they are qualitatively invariant. Only qualitatively identical phenomena can be quantified. You can't add apples and oranges, as the slogan goes. The obsession with quantifying variables forces cross-cultural psychologists to minimize qualitative differences and focus on similarities. Quantification is only possible if one abstracts from real, concrete cultural variations and defines cultural and psychological factors in abstract terms.

This leads cross-cultural psychologists to compare the impact of "religiosity" on "self-esteem" in Indonesia and Australia in abstract terms. They measure religiosity by uninformative scale questions such as "how strongly do you feel religious?" They measure self-esteem by uninformative scale questions such as "how much do you value yourself?" These scales measure whether degree/level/amount of "religiosity" generates the same degree/level/amount of self-esteem in different countries. However, no content or quality to these phenomena is examined. Yet the content is crucial in comparing these phenomena. Being religious is a complex and indefinite state. It includes knowing that god exists, believing in god but having some doubts about whether it exists, believing it occasionally but not always, believing in some higher power but not an anthropomorphic god, belonging to an organized religious group or not. In addition, one's conception of a god has different features. All of this is ignored in the variable "religiosity." Resulting comparisons of religiosity are thus empty.

Cross-cultural psychologists err in privileging comparisons among cultures to concrete analyses of particular cultures. They put the cart before the horse. Cross-cultural psychologists begin with a view toward comparing cultures, and this structures their research along the line of common variables.

Comparisons must take place after concrete analysis elucidates real features (Ratner, 1997). For instance, educational achievement would include how students learn, how they think, how they solve problems, how they understand science, what their motivation is, and what their goals are in Norwegian public education and in Islamic, Saudi education. Or concrete aspects of religiosity would be compared in Indonesia and Australia -- e.g., what religion consists in, what it means to them, how it is socialized, how it affects their daily lives, how it affects their understanding of scientific concepts, how it affects their sexuality, how religiosity is violated, etc.

From these concrete responses, general relations can be formulated about how religion affects sexuality and accepting and understanding scientific concepts. When general categories are derived from concrete responses, the former have significance that can be gleaned from the latter. When general categories are formulated on their own, they lose significant content that clarifies them.

In order to explain quantitative differences in the relation between abstract variables (e.g., religiosity and self-esteem), cross-cultural psychologists postulate an additional, common, abstract variable. Perhaps "social complexity" will be posited as being greater in Australia than Indonesia, and this will be proposed to explain the quantitative difference

between religiosity and self-esteem. Cross-cultural psychologists construct a closed system of abstractions in which one abstract variable is postulated to explain another (Ratner, 2012d).

Cross-cultural psychology is apolitical. Its closed set of abstractions floats above concrete social structures, social classes, ideologies, mystifications, forms of oppression and resistance. This renders improving psychological functioning dependent upon increasing or decreasing some abstract cultural variable such as social complexity, religiosity, income, or neuroticism, or some psychological variable such as expressive communication, listening skills, tolerance, or resilience. Psychological improvement does not entail change in concrete cultural factors such as neoliberalism, the profit motive, Communist ideology, racial or gender apartheid, social class structure, alienation, monarchical government, or mystical religion. Cross-cultural psychology is a politically conservative ideology that sustains the status quo by ignoring its real features. Silencing reality is as effective in sustaining it as proclaiming its beneficence. (Ignoring Wahhabi Islam sustains it as much as broadcasting it five times per day does.) Legitimation by obfuscation complements legitimation by proclamation.

Future Directions

Macro cultural psychology will deepen the cultural hermeneutical analysis of psychology that Dilthey, Simmel, and others pioneered. We will treat culture as the hermeneutic circle of psychological phenomena, and we will explain, describe, and predict psychological phenomena in terms of their cultural contexts and constituents. We will deepen our psychological theory, cultural theory, and political theory. We will develop Marx and Engels' cultural theory to understand the centrality of political economy to cultural systems and to psychological phenomena. We will advance macro cultural psychological methodology to ascertain the relation between macro cultural factors and psychology. This will draw heavily upon historical methodology (historiography) that identifies how historical behavior is grounded in historical conditions. We will extend the theory and methodology to increasingly wider psychological topics (see Ratner & El-Badwi, 2011 for a macro cultural psychological analysis of mental illness). We will emphasize ways in which psychology is political. We will design interventions that make people aware of macro cultural bases and characteristics of their psychological phenomena. We will help people repudiate, circumvent, and transform harmful macro cultural factors.

Macro cultural psychology's scientific theory and methodology have uniquely progressive political implications. For by scientifically tracing psychology to macro cultural factors, we expose these factors to critique and transformation. This symbiosis may be outlined as follows:

1) Define a topic -- e.g., educational psychology, language learning, mental illness, anti-social behavior -- and explore it in relation to…

2) Macro cultural factors. Identify macro cultural factors that form, inform, and are maintained by the topic. Explain how cultural factors make the topic fulfilling or retarding. This is a "centrifugal analysis," akin to the hermeneutic analysis of Dilthey and Simmel.

3) Identify changes in macro cultural factors that would significantly transform the topic – either improving or diminishing the psychological functioning of the topic. This "centripetal analysis" is how we transform a psychological topic (T) to a new version (T'). We do not seek to transform T to T' by working on its features in isolation from macro cultural factors.

This centrifugal-centripetal methodology may be depicted in figure one.

Figure 1

Macro Cultural Psychological Methodology for Maximizing Attention to

Macro Cultural Factors on Behavior/Psychology, and for Maximizing

Transformation of Behavior/Psychology

Macro Cultural Factors 1 ⟶ Macro Cultural Factors 2

Topic (T)

Topic (T')

Macro Cultural
Factors 1 ⟶ Macro Cultural Factors 2

4) Devise interventions on a micro level that will explicate 2) and help individuals repudiate and circumvent negative macro cultural factors while embracing positive ones. This is how the individual can deal with 2) in his own life.

5) Encourage individuals to work for political change on the macro level to improve psychological functioning.

6) Critique scientific psychological analyses that ignore macro cultural factors.

7) Critique interventions that attempt to enhance psychological functioning without identifying, circumventing, and altering macro cultural factors.

Liberals such as Martha Nussbaum call for a human development model of education that emphasizes critical thinking, concern for people, and Socratic teaching and learning. However, these proposals are futile within the status quo dominated by neoliberalism. The only way to implement them is to displace the capitalist class from social, economic, and political power (see Emancipation in this encyclopedia, as well as Ratner, 2012a, 2013b) -- just as social transformation of the class structure was necessary

to eliminate slave owners, the feudal aristocracy, colonists, and missionaries who made humanistic reforms impossible.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia, where the author spent most of 2011 working on curriculum reform in a university, seeks to upgrade its universities by streamlining courses, specifying requirements, requiring syllabi, rigorous testing, and student evaluations of teachers. However, there is no addressing of the causes of educational backwardness which lie in the highly restrictive, dogmatic, and punitive Wahhabi Islam that is forced upon the people. (It is illegal, for example, for someone to quite the Wahhabi faith.) This version of Islam requires rote memory, it is anti-scientific (it dismisses evolution), it prohibits critical reasoning about Islamic dogma, it enforces blind faith and conformity, it prohibits free imagination and creativity in the arts, and it usurps a large proportion of course requirements in school. The monarchy that rules Saudi Arabia and prohibits civil government and political participation, contributes to this intellectual timidity and sterility. Narrow educational reform of curricula will be fruitless unless it displaces these macro cultural impediments to education.

Macro cultural psychology is the only psychological approach whose

scientific perspective has such progressive political implication. Its

good politics are symbiotic with its good science.

References

Baltodano, M. (2012). Neoliberalism and the demise of public education:

The corporatization of schools of education. International Journal of

Qualitative Studies in Education, 25, 4, 487-507.

(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2012.673025)

Callaghan, T. et al. (2011). Early social cognition in three cultural contexts.

Monographs of The Society for Research in Child Development, vol. 76,

#2, 1-142.

Cruikshank, B. (1996). Revolutions within: Self-government and self-

esteem. In A. Barry, T. Osborne, & N. Rose (Eds.), Foucault and political

reason (pp. 231-252). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Darling-Hammond, L. (Jan. 30, 2012). Redlining our schools: Why is Congress writing off poor children? The Nation, 294, 5, 11-15.

Delacroix, J., Nielsen, F. (2001). The beloved myth: Protestantism and the rise of industrial capitalism in nineteenth-century Europe. Social Forces, 80, 509-553.

Fanon, F. (2008). Black skin white masks. New York: Grove. (Originally published 1952).

Galt, R. (2012, forthcoming). From homo economicus to complex subjectivities: Reconceptualizing farmers as pesticide users. Antipode.

Glass, J., & Jacobs, J. (2005). Childhood religious conservatism and adult attainment among black and white women. Social Forces, 84, 555-579.

Harrington, A. (2000). In defence of *Verstehen* and *Erklaren:* Wilhelm Dilthey's Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology. Theory & Psychology, 10, 435-451.

Hammack. P. (2011). <u>Narrative and the politics of identity: The Cultural psychology of Israeli and Palestinian youth</u>. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Hull, K., & Nelsen, R. (2000). Assimilation, choice, or constraint? Testing theories of gender differences in the careers of lawyers. <u>Social Forces, 79</u>, 229-264.

Ilyenkov, E. (2012). Dialectics of the ideal. <u>Historical Materialism, 20</u>, 2: 149–93. (Originally written 1975).

Jack, R., et al. (2012). Facial expressions of emotion are not culturally universal. <u>Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences, USA, 109</u> no. 19, 7241-7244.

Kahn, S. (2010). <u>Privilege: The making of an adolescent elite at St. Paul's school</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mansfield, B. (2007). Privatization: Property and the remaking of nature–society relations. <u>Antipode, 39</u>, 393-405.

Martin, P. (2004). Gender as social institution. <u>Social Forces, 82,</u>1249-1273.

Marx, K. (1973). <u>Grundrisse: Introduction to the critique of</u>

<u>political economy</u>. New York: Random House. (written

in1857)

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we

think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism, <u>Psychological</u>

<u>Bulletin 134</u>: 311–342.

Ratner, C., & Hui, L. (2003). Theoretical and methodological problems in

cross-cultural psychology. <u>Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior,</u>

<u>33</u>, 67-94.

Ratner, C. (1997). <u>Cultural psychology and qualitative methodology:</u>

<u>Theoretical and empirical considerations</u>. N.Y.: Plenum.

Ratner, C. (2012a). <u>Macro cultural psychology: A political philosophy of mind</u>.

Oxford University Press.

Ratner, C. (2012b). Macro cultural psychology. In Jaan Valsiner (Ed.),

Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology (chap. 10). Oxford

University Press. 2011.

Ratner, C. (2012c). Cultural psychology. In Robert Rieber (Ed.),

Encyclopedia of the History of Psychological Theories, chap. 28.

Springer, 2011.

Ratner, C. (2012d). Review of Liamputtong, Performing Qualitative

Cross-Cultural Research, and Matsumoto & Van de Vijver, Cross-

Cultural Research Methods. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 9,

4, 371-374.

Ratner, C. (2013a). Macro cultural psychology: Its development, concerns,

politics, and direction. In M. Gelfand, C. Chiu, Y. Hong (Eds.), Advances in

culture and psychology (vol. 3, chap. 6). N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Ratner, C. (2013b). <u>Cooperation, community, and co-ops in a global era</u>. N.Y.: Springer.

Ratner, C., & McCarthy, J. (1990). Ecologically relevant stimuli and color memory, <u>J. General Psychology, 117</u>, 369-377.

Ratner, C., & El-Badwi, S. (2011). A cultural psychological theory of mental illness, supported by research in Saudi Arabia. <u>Journal of Social Distress and The Homeless</u>, 20, #3-4, 217-274. (http://www.sonic.net/~cr2/cult psy mental illness.pdf)

Sanderson, S., Abrutyn, S., & Proctor, K. (2011). Testing the Protestant Ethic thesis with quantitative historical data: A Research note. <u>Social Forces, 89</u>, 905-911.

Uskul, A., et al. (2012). Honor bound: The cultural construction of honor in Turkey and the northern United States. <u>Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43</u>, 1131-1151.

Wodak, R. (1995). Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. In J. Verschueren, J-O Östman, & J. Blommaert (Eds.), <u>Handbook of pragmatics, manual</u> (204-210). John Benjamins Pub Co.: Amsterdam/Philadelphia.