Published in Cross-Cultural
Psychology Bulletin, 2004, 38, 1-2, pp. 18-24.
A Cultural Critique of Psychological Explanations of
Terrorism
Institute for Cultural Research & Education
http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2
In the Bulletin
special issue on terrorism (2003 September), Triandis (2003) and Kashima (2003)
propose psychological and cultural issues that help to explain terrorism.
Although cross-cultural psychologists manifest a greater sensitivity to culture
then typical mainstream psychologists, I wish to argue that their discussion
could be strengthened by an even greater emphasis on cultural factors. I do not
explain what these factors are because I am not expert in the field of
terrorism. Rather, I point out general cultural issues which are important for
understanding behavior. I point out shortcomings of analyses which fail to
consider these issues.
Triandis & Kashima
emphasize that terrorism is rooted in poverty and inequality. (This, of course,
does not justify terrorism, it simply explains it.) However, the authors do not
pursue the full nature of this inequality, the brutal ways in which it is
imposed, and the manner in which it provokes terrorism. The authors instead
invoke psychological constructs to supplement cultural constructs in explaining
terrorism. The psychological constructs denote abstract, universal, natural
psychological processes and tendencies. Such an interactionist model of
incongruous factors is insufficient on scientific grounds and political grounds
as well.
Triandis claims that
terrorism is motivated not only by poverty but by personality problems as well:
The personalities of terrorists contradict prevalent social values. Thus, Saudi
Arabia is a collectivist culture but the 9/11 terrorists were idiocentric
personalities. According to Triandis, such misfits try to change their culture
to fit their personalities. But the Arab terrorists of 9/11 couldn't change
their culture because it was protected by the US. Also attacking their own
culture would hurt many of their kinsmen. "Thus, hitting the USA can be
viewed as a displacement of the motivation to change their own culture"
(Triandis, 2003, p. 35).
Triandis' claim that
personality disorders and displacement motivate terrorism is speculative and
illogical. If the terrorists were afraid to attack their own country because it
was protected by the USA, then it makes little sense to attack the USA on its
homeland where it was protected much more strongly by its military. In addition,
there is no evidence that the terrorists were idiocentric and misfits in their
own country. There is certainly no evidence that psychodynamic principles of
displacement were at work in the psyches of the terrorists.
None of the psychological
constructs which Triandis postulates explains the intended behavior. Misfits do
not ordinarily try to change their culture. Most misfits become mentally
disturbed or submerge themselves in some escape -- such as work or gambling --
to ease their pain, Nor does difficulty in changing one's own culture
necessarily lead to trying to change another. Nor does trying to change another
culture necessarily lead to terrorism. There are many other ways of trying to
change a culture. It is important to recognize that Triandis' psychological
constructs do not, either singly or in combination, explain terrorism.
Triandis contradicts his own
argument by admitting that the terrorists acted as a well organized group -- as
collectivists. "Idiocentrics become allocentric in some situations."
But if the idiocentric terrorists acted allocentrically (collectively), then
were they really idiocentric? How can we identify idiocentrics if they act
collectively? Triandis tries to rescue his unsupportable hypothesis by claiming
that individualism can be "expressed" in different ways (p. 34).
Thus, people who act collectively can still really be idiocentric.
But we all know that 9/11 terrorism wasn't
just a momentary collective action in extenuating circumstances. It took years
of coordination and planning and trust and comraderie. It is sophistry to call
such devoted, consistent collectivists idiocentric -- i.e., to postulate
individualists who simply expressed their personalities collectively.
Moreover, if they
were able to live so collectively as terrorists, why couldn't they have adapted
successfully to the allocentric Arabian culture? Why did they feel out of place
at all? Why did they become terrorists? Triandis admits that idiocentrics
become allocentric when "he is in a collectivist culture and in the
company of many allocentrics, where the situation emphasizes common fate or
similarityŠ" (p. 34). But this means that idiocentric terrorists in Saudi
Arabia should have adapted to the presence of the many allocentrics and become,
or acted, allocentrically. It contradicts his entire claim that terrorists are
idiocentrics who are out of place in a collectivist society!
Triandis further contradicts his claim by admitting that
"this [psychological] analysis is only superficial" (p. 36). He says
that economic, political, and cultural issues are more fundamental to
understanding terrorism. He mentions the poverty, starvation, and disease that
confront third world people. Triandis also mentions a religious interpretation
of this suffering, that it is unjust according to god. The suffering is
inflicted by the devil which is the US. The devil is resisted violently because
violence is part of the cultural and religious definition of masculinity (p.
399). Triandis' illuminating comments about the cultural conditions and
cultural psychology of terrorists lead to a conclusion that as long as
imperialist policies are promoted by the first world (e.g., the IMF), we will
have revolutions and terrorism (p. 38).
Instead of pursuing these
cultural issues, Triandis abandons them and switches back to his psychologistic
argument that terrorism is due to personality mismatch with culture. He
presents questionnaire data which "suggest" that members of a
terrorist organization in Pakistan are idiocentrists living in an allocentric
society. On the face of it, such a conclusion is oxymoronic. Members of an
organization who embrace a common goal and belief system, act collectively and
cooperatively, have a tight and exclusive bond, and are even willing to give up
their lives for a social cause, hardly qualify as idiocentrics, who are
"strongly motivated for personal achievement" (p. 37).
Triandis' psychologism
contradicts his cultural analysis. It also contradicts his cultural solution to
terrorism. Instead of identifying cultural reforms that could mitigate
terrorism, Triandis ends with a pessimistic, apathetic conclusion that
"terrorism is a problem with no solution." Of course it has no
solution if it is due to individual personality traits. These traits cannot be modified
through social policies. Psychologistic explanations are apolitical, and
politically apathetic. On the other hand, emphasizing cultural explanations of
terrorism lead to a definite solution to this horrific activity -- oppose
imperialism of the West, and fundamentalism of the East. Social policies and
movements can modify these factors, whereas they cannot modify personality
traits and defense mechanisms.
Kashima's article manifests
the foregoing weaknesses more egregiously. Kashima (2003) pays less attention
to cultural pressures which provoke terrorism, and to cultural concepts which
generate terroristic responses to these pressures. Kashima makes a few, brief,
scattered comments about social injustice in the world; however these are
tangential to, and contradicted by, his focus upon abstract psychological
constructs.
Kashima's conception of
terrorism obscures crucial political and psychological dimensions of it. He
defines terrorism as the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence
against governments, publics, or individuals to attain a political objective.
This definition fails to identify the concrete objectives or conditions of the
violence. These include whether one is trying to overthrow totalitarianism or
democracy; if one is working to promote freedom or oppression. Kashima's
general definition would label revolutionary acts as terrorist. Most
revolutionary acts to oppose injustice and totalitarianism inflict
unpredictable violence against the oppressors to attain a political objective.
Kashima condemns these as terrorist: "Violent challenges to an oppressive
regime are often called freedom fighting, a different name for terrorism in
fact" (Kashima, 2003, p. 18). Slaves killing their masters are thus
terrorists according to Kashima. Equating the armed struggle for freedom with
terrorism precludes understanding terrorism.
Kashima further obscures the
cultural and psychological nature of terrorism by selectively applying his
broad definition to acts directed against Western powers. He never mentions
state-sponsored terrorism which is more brutal. American funded and trained
death squads throughout Latin America, attempts by the CIA to destabilize
governments throughout the world, the capturing of Africans for slavery during
the 17th and 18th centuries, and brutal dictatorships
which torture their own citizens, and the recent revelations about American
soldiers torturing Iraqi and Afghanistani prisoners are examples of
state-sponsored terrorism that Kashima never considers. Ignoring such blatant
examples of terrorism makes it impossible to understand the phenomenon.
The social psychology of
government bureaucrats who order and finance terrorism is quite different from
the social psychology of government agents who inflict the mayhem. The suicide
bomber who is a member of a fanatic religious group has yet a different social
psychology.
Kashima acknowledges that
certain people are economically deprived
and have few mechanisms for redress. However, he doesn't emphasize this
condition as a fundamental incentive for terrorism. Instead, he submerges this
condition in a host of other factors.
For example, Kashima claims
that globalization offers an opportunity for terrorists to gain publicity for
their political agenda -- to place it on the "communal common ground of
the people who engage in public discourse" about it. "Globalization
makes terrorism an `attractive' political strategy for some" (p. 19).
Kashima reverses the role of globalization from a violent intrusion that
provokes terroristic opposition, to a neutral medium which terrorists use to
advance their violent agendas. It's not globalization that's the problem, it's
the way that terrorists use the globalized flow of information.
Kashima emphasizes the
psychological level of explanation rather than the cultural level. He discusses
ways that people form in-group and out-group distinctions. This process leads
to defining one's group in opposition to other groups. (p. 20). Kashima calls
these cultural processes. But they are really interpersonal mechanisms which
are presumed to be natural. They are not part of any particular cultural value
system or system of social institutions.
Kashima reduces culture to
interpersonal groups. He completely ignores macro factors such as ideologies
and social institutions such as the World Bank. He believes that intergroup
relations have "cultural dynamics" (p. 20), and it is these that
generate prejudice and terrorism. "When a cultural element [e.g.,
appearance, behavior] is seen to differentiate `us' and `them', it
simultaneously invites certain ways of construing the intergroup relation"
(p. 20, my emphasis). When religion was used to differentiate groups, it led to
the Crusades. For Kashima, the social psychology of group differentiation is
what invites conflict.
Years ago, the
anthropologist Leslie White wrote a seminal essay entitled "Culturological
vs. Psychological Interpretations of Human Behavior" (White (1949, pp.
121-145). He argued that psychological mechanisms do not explain cultural
phenomena. Durkheim, Parsons, Bourdieu, Kroeber, and other
"structuralists" made the same point. Their criticism applies
directly to Kashima. His invoking of abstract psychological constructs such as
in-group out-group distinctions, "negotiating" (i.e., deciding) the
meaning of a group, and groups acting as social agents (pp. 20-21) do not
explain any concrete cultural behavior. None of them possesses any specific
content, and all of them can be infused with any content that will animate any
behavior. Distinguishing an in-group from an out-group can be used benevolently
to identify a group in need. We can distinguish handicapped people, or
children, from able-bodied adults and then offer them special salutary
treatment. Distinguishing features of people does not invite any particular
behavior; it is compatible with all kinds of behavior. It is simplistic to
claim that the Crusades were invited, or afforded, by the mere fact of
observing religious differences. Broader, real cultural factors were behind the
Crusades.
The same holds for
terrorism. Kashima claims that terrorism is afforded by the global exchange of
information which lets impoverished people see the contrast between themselves
and wealthy Westerners. The contrast can be hardened into fixed, antagonistic
identities. Relative deprivation can also be experienced. This can lead to
revenge or attempts to subjugate the "out-group" (p. 24). Now, none
of these abstract psychological mechanisms explains terrorism. (Just as
Triandis' constructs failed to do so.) The fact that people notice differences
in wealth between themselves and others does not necessarily lead them to
differentiate or oppose themselves to the others. Nor does relative deprivation
necessarily lead to seeking revenge on the other group. Abstract psychological
factors do not add up to concrete cultural experience or action (cf. Ratner
& Hui, 2003). One cannot reach into an arsenal of general, abstract
constructs and apply them to any particular issue that comes along. One needs
specific information about an issue such as terrorism in order to identify its
causes. Kashima presents no data about terrorism, per se -- no observations or
interviews with terrorists. It is not surprising that his purported
explanations fail to inform us about terrorism, per se. The explanatory
constructs are so abstract that they are compatible with numerous other
behaviors as well.
Kashima's & Triandis'
hypothetical constructs do not explain all forms of terrorism. None of them
explains state terrorism against other governments and populations. Government
officials and agents do not massacre hundreds of thousands of peasants,
priests, nuns, educators, intellectuals, and union organizers because they
experience relative deprivation, seek revenge, seek to negotiate their identity
and act as group agents, have personality differences with their culture, or
form stereotypes of the victims. None of what Kashima and Triandis say about
terrorism applies to the American military police in Abu Ghraib prison who
gleefully terrorized Iraqi prisoners without any ideological fervor, dogmatic
thinking, or stereotyping.
Nor do abstract
psychological constructs offer any solution to terrorism. Triandis admits he
has no solution. And Kashima's analysis culminates only in a banal conclusion
that: "Researchers of culture and psychology, with our global outlook, can
act as a positive constructive force by clarifying the nature of human
variation, the process of cultural dynamics, and potential risks and
opportunities for the globalizing human society" (p. 25).
A far more insightful and
effective strategy is to understand the concrete cultural issues involved in
terrorism. Some of these, in the case of Arab people, were eloquently expressed
by a young Iraqi to a journalist recently:
"For Fallujans it is a shame to have foreigners
break down their doors. It is a shame for them to have foreigners stop
and search their womenŠThis is a great shame for the whole tribe. It is
the duty of that man, and of that tribe, to get revenge on this soldier
-- to kill that man. Their duty is to attack them, to wash the shame.
The shame is a stain, a dirty thing; they have to wash it. No
sleep -- we cannot sleep until we have revenge. They have to kill
soldiers" (Danner, 2004, p. 46).
This man describes both the
conditions that provoke terrorism as well as the ideology and cultural
psychology that guide the terroristic response to these conditions.
Comprehending these kinds of factors, rather than postulating abstract
psychological constructs, will make us better prepared to understand the
reasons for terrorism, and to mitigate it by removing its basis in cultural
life.
Danner, M. (June 10, 2004).
Torture and truth. New York Review of Books, pp. 46-50).
Kashima, Y. (2003).
Terrorism and globalization: A social psychological analysis of culture and
intergroup relations in the contemporary world. Cross-Cultural Psychology
Bulletin, 37, 3, 17-25.
Ratner, C., & Hui, L.
(2003). Theoretical and methodological problems in cross-cultural psychology. Journal
for the Theory of Social Behavior, 33, 67-94.
Triandis, H. (2003). Some
hypotheses on the psychology of terrorism. Cross-Cultural Psychology
Bulletin, 37, 3, 33-40.
White, L. (1949). The
science of culture: A study of man and civilization. New York: Farrar, Strauss.
About the author: Carl Ratner has written numerous books and articles
about the theory and methodology of cultural psychology. He currently conducts
workshops on these topics in many countries. His most recent articles are a
critique of tendencies within cross-cultural psychology, and a critique of the
way that news media report on genetic aspects of psychology. Ratner's
publications may be found on his web site: http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2